The six-hour reporting path
A named person, a tested route to CERT-In, and a decision rule that triggers on noticing rather than on certainty. Rehearsed, because a path nobody has walked is not a path.
Governance, Risk & Compliance
The CERT-In Directions of 28 April 2022 are short, specific and unusually unforgiving. Most organisations can describe them. Very few can prove, on a Tuesday, that they would meet the six-hour clock on a Saturday night.
Issued under sub-section (6) of section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Directions apply to service providers, intermediaries, data centres, body corporates and government organisations. They are not a framework to be adopted at your own pace; they are in force, and non-compliance is an offence under the Act.
Seven directions carry the weight. Clocks synchronised to NIC or NPL time sources. Cyber incidents reported to CERT-In **within six hours of noticing them**. A designated point of contact on file. ICT system logs maintained for a rolling 180 days **and held within Indian jurisdiction**. Extended record-keeping obligations for data centres, VPS, cloud and VPN providers, and for virtual asset service providers. And an Annexure listing the incident types that must be reported — which is longer, and broader, than most organisations assume.
The gap we find most often is not ignorance of the rule. It is that the six-hour clock starts at *noticing*, not at confirming — so an organisation whose process requires certainty before it reports has already designed itself into breach. The second most common gap is logs that meet the 180-day window but sit in a foreign cloud region, which satisfies neither half of the fourth direction.
Coverage
Readiness against each direction, and the runtime that keeps it true afterwards.
A named person, a tested route to CERT-In, and a decision rule that triggers on noticing rather than on certainty. Rehearsed, because a path nobody has walked is not a path.
Whether your detection and triage can actually recognise the listed incident types in time for the clock to be met. This is where the requirement is won or lost.
What is logged, for how long, where it physically sits, and whether it is protected from alteration. Both halves of the direction, evidenced from configuration rather than from policy.
NTP to NIC or NPL across every server, appliance and log source. Unglamorous, and the reason correlated evidence either exists or does not.
Designated, filed with CERT-In, and kept current when the person changes role — the failure mode nobody plans for.
For data centres, VPS, cloud and VPN providers, and for virtual asset service providers: the five-year subscriber and transaction records the fifth and sixth directions require.
Approach
Gap, fix, rehearse, evidence.
Each direction assessed against what is actually in place, not against what the policy says. Output is a short list of real shortfalls.
Logging, retention, jurisdiction, time sources and the reporting path — with the changes made rather than recommended.
A tabletop against a realistic incident, timed. The question answered is whether six hours is achievable with the people who would actually be awake.
The artefacts that show compliance, collected on a cycle in SemperWise One™ so the position holds between assessments.
In the platform
Not a claim about coverage in the abstract — this is the clause library and the evidence collection that ship today.
Each one carried as a control with its own state, owner, test date and evidence — not a checklist item.
Gathered on a cycle and filed against the clauses they evidence, with a collection date and an expiry.
Of the 29 subjects our unified control model defines. This is what makes a second framework cheaper than the first.
Each artefact carries a collection date and an expiry, because evidence that is two years old is not evidence — it is history. When one lapses, everything resting on it is flagged rather than left quietly asserting something that stopped being true.
Deliverables
The report is the product. If it cannot be acted on by a developer and understood by a director, we have not finished.
Each of the seven, with the evidence reviewed and the shortfall stated plainly.
Who decides, who reports, by what route, and what goes in the report — rehearsed and timed.
What is retained, for how long, and where it physically sits.
Log-retention and audit-trail artefacts collected on a cycle, dated, and filed against the direction they evidence.
Is this for you?
If none of them are, say so on the call and we will tell you honestly whether this is the right piece of work — or point you at the one that is.
Book a scoping callHow we work
The same engagement model applies to every piece of work we take on, so you always know what happens next.
A 30-minute call, then a written scope: what is in, what is out, what we need from you and what it costs. Nothing starts before you sign it.
Rules of engagement, testing windows, escalation contacts and a signed authorisation. Out-of-hours windows where production cannot take the load.
Automated coverage first, then manual testing where judgement is required. Critical findings are reported the day we confirm them, not at the end.
One report a developer can act on and an executive can read, with evidence, reproduction steps, business impact and a fix for every finding.
A walkthrough call with your engineers. We answer questions on the fix, not just the finding.
A free retest cycle to confirm the fixes hold, and a clean summary you can hand to a customer, auditor or board.
Questions
The questions clients actually ask during scoping. If yours is not here, ask it directly.
No. There is no CERT-In compliance certificate to buy, and anybody offering one is selling something else. The Directions are law under section 70B of the IT Act; you either meet them or you do not. What can be evidenced is readiness, the controls in place and the artefacts that demonstrate them — and that is what we produce. CERT-In *empanelment* is a separate thing: it is a status held by auditing organisations, not a compliance mark for the entity being audited.
On noticing the incident — not on confirming it, not on completing triage, and not on management sign-off. That distinction is the single most consequential detail in the Directions, and designing a process that needs certainty first is the most common way organisations put themselves in breach without realising.
The fourth direction requires ICT system logs to be maintained for a rolling 180 days and maintained within Indian jurisdiction. Retention alone is not sufficient; a 400-day archive in a foreign region does not satisfy it. We review where logs physically sit, in configuration rather than in contract.
Annexure-I to the Directions lists the types, and the list is broader than most organisations expect — it extends well beyond breaches into areas such as targeted scanning, unauthorised access and attacks on infrastructure and connected devices. The practical work is making sure your detection and triage can recognise them quickly enough to matter.
No — the obligation is the entity's, and it is not delegable to a vendor. What we do is build and rehearse the path so the people who hold the obligation can meet it, and keep the evidence that shows they are able to.
Next step
A 30-minute call, then a scope document with what is in, what is out and what it costs. No obligation, and no charge for the conversation.